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The cost of expanding access to acute medical care is one of the least
understood aspects of health-care reform. As of January 1992, over twenty
health-care reform proposals had been introduced before Congress, each with
a different target population, scope of benefits, source of financing, and role
for the public sector.' Analysis of these plans has produced a wide range of
cost estimates, and as the debate over health-care reform intensifies, attention
is likely to focus on the costs of reform. The purpose of this Article is to
provide a framework for evaluating the costs of various health-care reform
proposals.
Most spending estimates associated with current health-care reform
proposals focus on total spending for one payer (e.g., government or
employers). Such estimates are misleading because they fail to identify the total
increase in spending on health care that will result from expansion of coverage
and the distributional impacts of changes in health-care costs. For example,
it was reported that the proposal submitted by the U.S. Bipartisan Commission
on Comprehensive Health Care (the Pepper Commission) was removed from
serious consideration due to its high costs.2 In fact, while it was widely
circulated that the acute care portion of the plan would cost $24 billion in
expenditures to the Federal Government the, net new spending from the plan
would represent half this figure, or $12 billion.3
To accurately and completely describe the costs of universal access or the
effects of a plan to reform the health-care system, we believe that such pro-
posals should be assessed from three perspectives:
* NET NEW SPENDING: total new health-care spending generated by
the expansions in insurance;
* DISTRIBUTION OF SPENDING: shifts in financing among payers that
occur under most health reform proposals; and
* RISE IN HEALTH-CARE SPENDING: the impact of the proposal on the
rise in health-care spending.
f Authors' Note: From Lewin-ICF, a Washington-based health policy consulting firm. We would like
to thank Robert J. Rubin, M.D., Allen Dobson, Ph.D, Timothy J. Eckels, Jessica Miller, and the staff
of the Yale Law & Policy Review for comments on drafts of this manuscript.
1. Victor Cohn, Moving on Health Care Reforn: The Challenge to the President and Congress, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 1992, (Health) at 10.
2. 1990: A Year in Review, MED. & HEALTH PERSP. (Janet Ochs Weiner ed., Dec. 24, 1990).
3. U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE, A CALL FOR ACTION 9 (Sept.
1990).
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To illustrate this framework, we focus on the spending associated with
three health-care reform prototypes. Although over twenty different proposals
are currently under consideration by Congress, health-care reform options are
essentially of three types: (1) tax credit proposals, whereby individuals are
given vouchers or tax credits to purchase health insurance, (2) employment-
based proposals, which build on the current system by requiring or placing
strong incentives on employers to provide coverage, and (3) public insurance
proposals, whereby the government would assume responsibility for providing
health insurance to all citizens.
Concrete examples of these three prototypes exist in the current debate.
The tax credit approach is exemplified by President Bush's plan4 to provide
vouchers and tax credits to the uninsured. The Senate leadership advocates the
employment-based approach.' The public health insurance proposal, modeled
after the Canadian health-care system, likewise has been proposed in
67Congress,' as well as in over a dozen states.7 We present the specifics of
these three plans in Exhibit 1.
In this paper, we seek to establish a framework for how the costs of each
health-care reform plan should be evaluated, and to discuss how and why the
costs of different types of plans can be expected to vary. We do not aim to
provide specific estimates of the costs of each of these plans for two reasons.
First, although some estimates have been made, it is difficult to estimate the
costs of current plans accurately at this time since many details remain
unspecified. Secondly, each plan will evolve as sponsors make changes to
address both technical and political concerns.
I. NET NEW SPENDING
Presentations of spending estimates often confuse the relationship between
total costs and net new costs. Total spending, the measure frequently used to
evaluate health-care reform proposals, represents the costs of a plan including
some costs that are currently in the system. This value, however, does not
indicate how much additional spending will be added through reform. A more
appropriate measure of the impact of health-care reform on system-wide costs
4. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH REFORM
PROGRAM (Feb. 6, 1992).
5. S. 1227, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 331, 332 (1991).
6. H.R. 1300, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
7. Universal health insurance bills are before state legislatures in California, Colorado, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Washington. The District of Columbia also has such a bill. Some of these plans are reviewed
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is net new spending, which reflects the increase in health-care spending that
will result from expansions in coverage.
Net new spending arises from an increase in utilization of medical services
as persons who were uninsured obtain coverage, as the currently insured
receive coverage for additional benefits, or from an increase in provider
payment rates. Net new spending also provides the best basis for comparing
the costs of reform proposals, since this estimate reflects the impact of each
plan on total health-care spending.
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Estimates for net new spending of a variety of proposals to provide
universal insurance for acute care services range from $10 billion to $25
billion.! Variation in these estimates can be explained by differences in the
design features of the individual plans, including: eligibility and enrollment;
benefits; cost-sharing; and provider payment. Such variation in net new
spending estimates, however, has little to do with whether the plan places the
major financial responsibility on individuals, employers, or government: if the
eligibility, benefits, cost-sharing and provider payment specifications are
identical, expansion of insurance under any of the three prototypical plans
would carry similar costs.
A. Eligibility and Enrollment
The net spending for any proposal to expand coverage is influenced both
by the number of people who are eligible for the expansion and by the number
of people who actually enroll. The characteristics of the eligible population also
influence costs. Since medical-care use varies by age and health status, the
costs of a plan would be higher if it enrolled primarily older or less healthy
individuals. For example, medical spending for those over age 65 averaged
$5,360 per person in 1987 compared to $1,286 per person for those under age
65.9
The President's plan targets uninsured persons below poverty as well as
the uninsured near-poor. Under the plan, individuals with incomes below
poverty would be able to obtain a transferable health insurance tax credit
8. These estimates refer only to acute care, and were obtained using the Lewin-ICF Health Benefits
Simulation Model (HBSM), a microsimulation model of health insurance coverage, health services
utilization, and sources of payments for health care. This model has been used to estimate the costs of
health-care reform proposals for the Pepper Commission, (see U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHEN-
SIVE HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 67); the Advisory Council on Social Security; the Health Care
Financing Administration; (see LEWIN-ICF, THE PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE MODEL FOR ACUTE CARE:
ESTIMATED COST AND IMPACTS (1991); LEWIN-ICF, THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PLAN FOR
UNIVERSAL ACCESS: ESTIMATED COST AND IMPACTS (1991) and LEWIN-ICF, THE INSURANCE MARKET
REFORM PROPOSAL: ESTIMATED COST AND IMPACTS (1991)); the National Leadership Commission on
Health Care; and over a dozen state governments (see, e.g., LEWIN-ICF, ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS TO
EXTEND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO PRIMARY CARE SERVICES TO THE UNINSURED
(1990); LEWIN-ICF, HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN WEST VIRGINIA: ISSUES AND OPTIONS (1992) and
LEWIN-ICF, PURSUING HEALTH CARE REFORM IN CONNECTICUT: ANALYSIS OF A PUBLIC HEALTH
INSURANCE MODEL (1992)). It uses data from the Current Population Survey, 1980 National Medical Care
Utilization and Expenditures Survey (NMCUES) aged to 1990 using National Health Account data, the
National Health Interview Survey, the Lewin-ICF. Employer Health Plan Survey, and a set of structural
assumptions regarding their relationships, to estimate the impact of policies designed to expand insurance
coverage. Assumptions regarding eligibility, benefits, cost-sharing and provider payment are input by the
user to describe the plan under consideration. The estimates above assume that previously uninsured persons
will adjust to levels reported by insured persons with similar characteristics, and that payments to providers
will follow their historical patterns Information on HBSM is on file at the Yale Law & Policy Review.
9. Daniel R. Waldo et al., Health Expenditures by Age Group, 1977 and 1987, 10 HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV. 111, 114 (1989).
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(certificate) equal to $3,750 to purchase health insurance.' 0 Tax credits of up
to $3,750 would be available to families with incomes less than $80,000."
This plan is estimated to expand coverage for approximately eleven million
Americans, assuming that all uninsured individuals below poverty receive the
tax credit. 12 The cost of the President's plan would vary by the extent to
which individuals decided to take advantage of the tax credit. Clearly, if all
eleven million persons decided to use the insurance certificate, the cost would
be substantially higher than if fewer people availed themselves of this option.
However, the net new costs of covering a subset of the entire group would not
necessarily be proportional to the fraction of individuals covered, since costs
would depend significantly on the health-care utilization patterns of those who
opt to use the certificate.
Why might some uninsured persons below poverty fail to take advantage
of the tax credit certificates to purchase insurance? To the extent that the cost
of health insurance exceeded the value of the certificate ($3,750), individuals
might not be able to afford the additional costs. For example, consider a health
insurance plan costing $5,000 per year for family coverage. After the tax
credit, $1,250 would have to be paid out-of-pocket. For a below-poverty
family of three, the additional $104 per month represents over 10% of its
income and it might be unaffordable. Moreover, the insurance available for
$3,750 might not include the benefits considered to be of greatest value to a
particular individual or family. In addition, the value of the tax credit would
not adjust for age, health status, or geographic region, and so the amount of
health insurance that could be purchased would vary enormously. Older
persons and those living in areas with high health-care costs might have
difficulty obtaining any coverage, and thus would be unable to take advantage
of the tax credit.
By contrast, the Mitchell bill and a public insurance plan would provide
coverage for all the uninsured and improve coverage for many of the under-
insured. The Mitchell bill would create two types of insurance-insurance
obtained from employers and insurance obtained through a public plan. The
private and public plans would provide the same benefits. Nevertheless, the
costs of these two sources of coverage are likely to be significantly different.
Under the employment-based approach, employers would be required to either
offer insurance to workers and their dependents or to pay a tax that is "the
lowest level consistent with maintaining a fair balance between public and
10. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 1.
11. Id.
12. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY AND FINANCING POLICY 24-26 (1991). Lewin-ICF calculation based on data from the March
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private health insurance coverage for employees."" 3 Employers would have
an incentive to provide coverage if the overall cost of providing coverage was
less than the amount of the tax. Low-income, older, and less healthy workers,
would be likely to obtain coverage from the public plan since the tax payment
would involve a smaller expenditure than providing coverage through the
employer-based plan. As the public plan would be comprised of older and less
healthy workers, the cost of coverage through the all-public plan is likely to
exceed the cost of employer-based insurance. The public plan would be
financed by the employer payroll tax as well as by general government
revenues, whereas the employer plans would be financed exclusively with
private funds.' 4
B. Benefits
More generous benefit packages can be expected to result in both higher
utilization of medical services and a more costly reform plan. The costs of
individual benefits vary substantially, and some benefits add more to the cost
of a plan than others. Benefits for which utilization is difficult to control-such
as mental health and substance abuse services-tend to inflate the costs of a
health-reform plan substantially, since insurers assume that many individuals
will use them. For example, evidence suggests that mental health services are
used whenever they are made available. 5 In designing benefit packages,
trade-offs need to be made between the cost of the benefit and the advantage
of expanding utilization of such services.
The benefits in the President's plan are not prescribed and are limited only
by the amount of health insurance that can be purchased for $3,750 for persons
below poverty, and by less than this amount for persons eligible for the tax
credit.' 6 Nationally, the average annual cost per employee for group health
insurance in 1991 was $3,573. ' Workers with incomes below poverty thus
could obtain a benefit package with close to the average level of benefits for
$3,750, assuming they could gain coverage similar to the group coverage that
many employees now enjoy.
The Mitchell plan would mandate that employers provide a basic level of
benefits, including inpatient and outpatient hospital and physician services,
diagnostic and radiology services, 45 days of inpatient psychiatric services,
and certain preventive services.'" The plan would exclude coverage for
13. S. 1227, supra note 5, at § 3601.
14. Id.
15. Jon R. Gabel & Gail A. Jerisen, The Price of Mandated Benefits, 26 INQUIRY 419, 425 (1989).
16. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4.
17. Diane Levick, Employer Health Costs Up, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 28, 1992, at B2.
18. S. 1227, supra note 5, at § 2721.
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outpatient mental health and prescription drugs. 9 The basic package would
be the same for everyone, regardless of whether persons receive employment-
based coverage or are covered under the public plan. A person with an income
below poverty and a good health status probably would be able to purchase
a benefit package similar to the one proposed in the Mitchell bill under the
President's plan. However, an older person or an individual with chronic or
disabling health conditions would have difficulty purchasing this level of
coverage for $3,750. To reflect the generally higher use of health services
among the elderly and persons with disabling conditions, insurance premiums
typically are adjusted upward.
C. Cost-Sharing
Cost-sharing refers to the amount individuals are required to contribute to
the cost of their health care. Its general purpose is to control the utilization of
health services. Cost-sharing may be of two types: deductibles and co-insur-
ance. Deductibles refer to an amount of out-of-pocket costs that must be
incurred before insurance benefits become available. Co-insurance refers to
a specific percentage of the cost of each service (or a flat fee per service) that
must be paid out-of-pocket. Results of the Rand Health Insurance Experiment
(HIE), a major study designed to estimate the impact of cost-sharing on health-
care utilization, demonstrated that utilization of health services is sensitive to
the cost-sharing requirements of health insurance plans.2" As cost-sharing
decreased, utilization of health services increased. The cost of health-care
reform proposals thus depends on the cost-sharing requirements of a particular
plan.
The cost-sharing requirements of the President's plan are dependent on the
type of insurance plan that can be purchased with the tax credit. For some
persons, out-of-pocket costs may be substantial, while for others insurance may
cover most of their needs. The Mitchell plan likewise incorporates some cost-
sharing requirements, whereas most of the public health insurance plans
eliminate cost-sharing altogether.
The elimination of cost-sharing is the principal reason that public health
insurance plans appear more costly than other plans. The elimination of cost-
sharing increases use and results in higher net new costs. Public health insur-
ance plans usually eliminate cost-sharing because the proponents view health
care as a right. Public health insurance plans could, of course, be structured
19. S. 1227, supra note 5, at § 2722 (calling for review of appropriateness of exclusion of services
one year after enactment).
20. Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Use of Medical Care in the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, 24 MED.
CARE S18, S22 (1986).
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with identical cost-sharing requirements of the employment-based plan or the
President's plan.
D. Provider Payment
Health-care reform proposals typically vary the payment level to both
physicians and hospitals providing care. In terms of physician payment, health
reform plans may involve a range of provisions, some of which would reduce
payments while others would increase them. The Mitchell plan specifies that
providers under the public plan would be reimbursed at rates equal to Medicare
payment rates. 21 In contrast, all-public health insurance plans usually specify
that providers would be reimbursed under a single fee schedule, similar to the
Medicare program.22
Many health reform proposals also propose to regulate hospital payment
through the use of uniform rates or global budget limits. Under a global
budget, a hospital is given a budget for annual expenditures. Hospitals are thus
forced to make tradeoffs among competing demands in order to remain within
the budget. The global budget provision can be found in the public health
insurance model.23 The President's plan does not specify changes in hospital
payment.24
In summary, if the three prototypical models were designed with the same
eligibility and enrollment benefit packages, cost-sharing requirements, and
provider payments, their net new costs would be similar. Any small differences
would largely be attributable to differences in administering the health-care
system.
II. DISTRIBUTION OF SPENDING
Health-care reform proposals typically involve substantial refinancing of
current medical spending. The uninsured currently receive a large amount of
care that is paid for out-of-pocket or as uncompensated care.' Refinancing
occurs when this type of care care-and any new care resulting from the
expansion-is financed through insurance. While net new spending estimates
range from $10 to $25 billion, changes in health-care spending for government,
business, or consumers often differ substantially from these figures.
It is important to distinguish between two common meanings of "distribu-
21. S. 1227, supra note 5, at § 2105.
22. See, e.g., H.R. 1300, supra note 6, at § 2123.
23. H.R. 1300, supra note 6, at § 2121.
24. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4.
25. This literature is reviewed in a Lewin-ICF Report. JACK NEEDLEMAN ET AL., THE HEALTH CARE
FINANCING SYSTEM AND THE UNINSURED 32-56 (1990).
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tion": payment incidence and financing incidence. Payment incidence refers
to the amount that is actually paid by government, business and consumers.
Financing incidence refers to how this money is generated. To illustrate this
distinction, consider a public insurance plan: government bears the entire
payment incidence, whereas business and consumers bear the financing
incidence through increased taxes. The payment incidence is highly dependent
on the political ideology underpinning the plan, while the financing incidence
can be changed depending on political and economic circumstances. Our
discussion will focus on payment incidence, as this is the distribution affected
by the choice of a plan.
Exhibit 2 presents the expected direction of change in the payment inci-
dence under the three prototypical plans for health reform. Numerical estimates
of the payment incidence under the President's plan or the Mitchell bill are
not currently available. The payments under these plans can be expected to
change substantially as they move through the legislative process and changes
occur in their design (e.g., benefits and cost-sharing). However, their provi-
sions can be used to estimate the direction of expected changes, as discussed
below. Note that this discussion is restricted to the payments involved in
expanding insurance, and does not include consideration of the financing
incidence. The financing incidence can be altered depending on whether taxes
are levied on consumers or employers.
Under the President's plan, 6 new payments would be borne primarily by
the federal government in the form of reduced tax revenues resulting from the
tax credits. Consumers also would bear part of the burden through higher out-
of-pocket costs. We would expect a number of states to reduce their Medicaid
programs and encourage individuals to obtain the tax credit certificate. Because
it currently contains no "maintenance of effort" clause (which would require
states to continue current levels of funding for health care), the President's
plan could produce windfalls to state governments. 27 Similarly, employers who
currently provide insurance to their low-wage workers would have an incentive
to drop this coverage and encourage their workers to obtain the certificate.
Thus, employers would be likely to reduce their total spending on health care
under the plan. These savings, however, could disappear if taxes are increased
to finance the plan.
26. ExEcuTivE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 27-30.
27. Id.
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Under an employment-based plan such as the Mitchell bill," payments
would be borne primarily by employers as they must either provide coverage
or pay a tax to fund the public plan. Government payments would also increase
since the tax revenue raised would be insufficient to cover the public plan's
full costs. Household out-of-pocket payments probably would decrease as the
uninsured obtain coverage and as insurance covers the costs of much of their
care.
The public health insurance plan29 would shift health-care payments
mainly to the federal government. Employers and state governments might
nonetheless be required to maintain their financial contributions to health care
or to contribute to the plan's costs. Out-of-pocket payments would decrease
under the all-public plan if cost-sharing is reduced or eliminated; however, a
tax increase to fund the government expenditures could erode these savings.
III. UNIVERSAL AccESS AND THE RISE IN HEALTH-CARE SPENDING
To gain political acceptance, any plan to expand access to health-care
insurance must address the initial costs of new medical care. Yet a more
critical long-term question is this: does the plan address the overall rise in
health-care spending? At this time, the persistent increase in acute-care costs
contributes to the erosion of medical-care access. Additionally, as insurers have
become more sophisticated at avoiding "risks," and as public programs have
reduced eligibility benefits, numerous factors independent of access concerns
have increased pressure to attenuate this cost surge. The following section
discusses the problems associated with increasing medical-care costs (especially
as they relate to access concerns), possible ways to curtail such costs, and cost-
containment remedies provided by existing proposals.
A. Control of Rising Health-Care Spending
The rise in spending has directly affected access to medical care in a
variety of ways. First, individuals and families are faced with higher insurance
premiums and out-of-pocket payments in health care. The fraction of average
family income spent on health care increased from 9% to 12% between 1980
and 1991.30 Although this trend, in part, reflects an increase in co-payments
(which, presumably, promotes more efficient use of health services), it also
reflects the expanding financial barriers to adequate medical care. Thus, many
28. S. 1227, supra note 5.
29. H.R. 1300, supra note 6.
30. Lewin-ICF estimate based on health spending and personal income data. Methods and data
available on request (on file at the Yale Law & Policy Review).
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Ameican families and individuals who face large cost-sharing burdens now
worry about their continuing ability to support themselves should they contract
a debilitating illness.
Second, the rise in spending has made it increasingly difficult for providers
to care for the uninsured and underinsured. Hospitals historically have subsi-
dized uninsured and underinsured patients with revenues from commercial
insurers and other payers that reimbursed hospitals for more than their own
costs.31 But, in recent years, as the number of uninsured patients has
increased,32 the number of paying patients has decreased, thus making it
increasingly difficult to subsidize patients who are unable to pay. The
deterioration and closing of hospitals in poor inner-city areas and rural areas
has exacerbated both geographic and financial access problems. Many inner-
city and rural areas have reported a lack of physicians, especially those willing
to provide primary care in disadvantaged areas.33
There has also been considerable pressure to address the rise in health-care
spending independent of the access issue. Rising health-care spending has
caused concern among a variety of interest groups, including government,
business, providers, and consumers.34 Projections by the Congressional
Budget Office indicate that 19.5 % of the federal budget will be spent on health
care by 1996. 3" Rising Medicaid and public health costs have further strained
state budgets.36 For business, health-care costs represent an increasing portion
of employer payroll; the fraction of employee compensation represented by
health insurance has grown from 2% in 1965 to over 6% in 1987. 37
To put the rise in spending in perspective, it is instructive to compare the
annual increases in spending with the cost of establishing universal access.
Health spending increased by an average of $52 billion annually between 1987
and 1990,38 a rise that dwarfs the estimated $10 to $25 billion in new spend-
ing that would be required to insure all of those currently lacking coverage.
31. Paul B. Ginsburg & Frank A. Sloan, Hospital Cost Shifting, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 893, 893
(1984).
32. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 12, at 18.
33. NATIONAL ASS'N OF COMMUNITY HEALTH CTRS., ACCESS TO COMMUNITY HEALTH CARE: A
DATA BOOK 3 (1990).
34. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 12, at 10.
35. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS: CAUSES, IMPLICATIONS, AND
STRATEGIES 1 (1991).
36. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, CRITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY AND FINANCING POLICY 101 (1991).
37. Katharine R. Levit et al., Health Spending and Ability to Pay.: Business, Individuals, and
Government, 10 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 8-9 (1989).
38. HHS News, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Oct. 2, 1991 at 6.
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1. Determinants of Rising Spending
Effective long-term control of health spending in the United States poses
daunting challenges for future legislators. The rise in acute-care costs can be
attributed to three major factors: diffusion of new technology, the rising costs
of the labor and supplies required to provide care, and the growth and aging
of the population (which cannot be controlled by policy intervention). 39 Some
reductions in spending may be achieved by improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of health-care providers. But, once these savings have been
realized, legislators will be able to control spending only by targeting the
factors responsible for the rise in spending.
Increases in spending on technology and labor have been responsible for
many dramatic improvements in patient care. For this reason, costs in both
these areas will prove highly difficult to control in future years. Medical
technology almost always adds to the total costs of care, as new therapies bring
more benefits to a wider population.40 Cost-saving technologies ultimately
may serve to reduce the rise in costs without reducing benefits; however, few
such technologies have been deployed or are expected to be deployed in the
near future. 4 Increases in the cost of labor and supplies are also difficult to
control, since hospitals are highly labor intensive, and must compete for skilled
personnel in competitive labor markets. Similar increases in costs are observed
by economists in other labor-intensive activities, such as the performing
arts.42
Observers of the health-care system frequently point to a variety of other
targets which, if removed, might reduce health-care spending substantially.
These include eliminating unnecessary care, and reducing the costs of
malpractice insurance. In the short run, the savings and increased efficiency
resulting from attacks on such targets might attenuate the increase in health
spending. In the long run, however, such efforts will have no effect on the real
culprits of rising costs: technology, labor, and demographics.
Elimination of useless and inappropriate care provides a case in point.
Efforts to eliminate the number of hospitalizations and the length of hospital
stays reduced system-wide costs substantially during the 1980s, and might
bring additional savings in the future.43 But the rise in spending is hardly
39. William Schwartz. The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment Strategies: Why They Can
Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257 JAMA 220, 220 (1987).
40. Henry J. Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us, 247
SCIENCE 418, 418-22 (1987).
41. Id.
42. WILLIAM BAUMOL & WILLIAM BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS: THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA 212
(1966).
43. William B. Schwartz & Daniel N. Mendelson, Hospital Cost Containment in the 1980s: Hard
Lessons Learned and Prospects for the 1990s, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1037 (1991).
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caused by useless and inappropriate care. In recent years, there has been only
a small decrease in hospital days despite hospitals' efforts to become more
efficient."
It is also unlikely that expansion of managed care will significantly alter
the rise in spending, even if such providers do not restrict the flow of
beneficial new technology. The principle feature of managed care organizations
which accounted for their lower acute care costs was the use of some 30%
fewer hospital days.45 While managed care costs at any given time were
lower, the rise in those costs has been indistinguishable from that of fee-for-
service care.'
Although spending on medical malpractice has received much attention in
recent years, malpractice expenses compose only a small fraction of acute-care
spending. For example, hospital malpractice premium costs increased total
hospital costs during 1983 and 1985 by an average of only 0.17% annually.47
While a similar estimate is not available for the physician sector, the overall
effects are still likely to be small: physician malpractice premiums constituted
only about 4.8% of physician spending in 1989.48 It is harder to estimate the
portion of the rise in spending resulting from "defensive medicine,"-provision
of care for the sole purpose of avoiding malpractice litigation-since the use
of tests carrying little expected benefit is often associated with small
incremental improvements in the standard of care. Even assuming that 18%
of all physician care results from efforts to avoid malpractice suits, Moser and
Musacchio estimated that premiums and "defensive medicine" combined only
contributed one percentage point to the annual rate of growth in physician
expenditures between 1982 and 1989. 4' Thus it seems unlikely that reform
of the malpractice system will substantially limit the rise in costs in the long
run.
44. Id.
45. Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Are Fee-for-Service Costs Increasing Faster than HMO Costs?, 23
MED. CARE 960 (1985); HAROLD S. LUFT, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS: DIMENSIONS OF
PERFORMANCE (1981).
46. Id.
47. Lewin-ICF calculation using data on hospital malpractice spending and total hospital costs. Data
(obtained from General Accounting Office and American Hospital Association) and methods available upon
request (on file at the Yale Law & Policy Review).
48. James W. Moser & Robert A. Musacchio, Health Care Statistical Highlights, 7 J. MED. PRAC.
MOMT. 3, 7 (1991).
49. Id. at 9.
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2. Effective Control of Spending
Once the efficiency savings discussed above have been achieved, cost
control of spending will require regulation of medical technology diffusion.
One way to achieve this is to impose "non-price rationing" (strict regulation
on the spread of medical technology). The British experience illustrates the
effects of such regulation.5" The rise in England's spending has been slowed
by explicit and implicit health-care rationing. Decisions regarding the allocation
of health care are made by the federal government and physicians. The delay
or denial of beneficial care has, of course, been difficult for the British people
to accept, and some have sought care outside the government-regulated sys-
tem.
51
The explosion in medical spending could also be controlled through price-
rationing. For example, an HMO could restrict its rise in costs if it went
beyond the strategy of reducing unnecessary care, and offered low-price
options that did not provide the most up-to-date technology. Studies of health
care in California also have suggested that increased competition can produce
significantly lower overall costs. 5 Although the source of these savings has
not been identified, the California experience suggests that promotion of price
competition helps stem the rise in costs.
The costs of services directly administered by the government ("direct
services") can readily be controlled through budgets that are directly managed
by government. The availability of new technology through direct services
programs could be monitored and limited. Government-funded services
provided through managed care organizations could be controlled in a similar
way: if a strict limit on per-capita spending were specified, the provider would
be forced to stay within that limit. Either way, this type of cost control
inevitably will result in some people not getting the most current or expensive
care. Spending on those services not under government control would be
expected to rise unless explicitly regulated.
50. HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIP-
TION: RATIONING HEALTH CARE 89-112 (1984).
51. id. at 106.
52. See, e.g., Jack Zwanziger & Glen A. Melnick, The Effects of Hospital Competition and the
Medicare PPS Program on Hospital Cost Behavior in California, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 301, 301 (1988).
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B. The Effect of Health-Care Reform on the Rise in Spending
Any proposal to reform the health-care system could, in theory, include
provisions that would effectively control the rise in medical spending. In
practice, however, few plans could achieve long-term control of spending. As
we have shown, control of spending is not easy and will inevitably involve the
denial of new beneficial technologies to some patients. Additionally, the limits
on hospital and other provider budgets contained in a number of current
proposals involve large-scale government intervention which is unpalatable to
a market-oriented administration. Although regulating the rise in costs is
important to addressing fundamental access concerns, in our opinion it
decreases the political acceptability of the plan. To date, no health reform plan
has squarely addressed the need for health-care rationing as a device to control
spending.
The President's reform plan53 contains three major provisions designed
to contain costs: malpractice and antitrust reform; reductions in administrative
costs; and expansions in the use of coordinated care. As discussed above, these
provisions might have some small effect on costs in the short run. Because they
do not control the diffusion of medical technology, however, they cannot
control the long-run rise in costs. Furthermore, the plan proposes to provide
services through an expansion of insurance access but provides no mechanism
for controlling the accompanying expansion in the costs of these benefits.
The Mitchell bill54 includes the calls for increased efficiency contained
in the Administration's plan. In addition, it currently contains a mechanism
that could (in theory) be used to control spending: expenditure targets designed
to constrain hospital budgets. A number of reform proposals designed to
establish a single payer for health care in the United States contain similar
provisions.55 Under these plans, the federal government would establish an
independent "Federal Health Expenditure Board," an agency responsible for
setting national goals for health spending and conducting negotiations with
providers to achieve these goals. To be successful, the Federal Health
Expenditures Board would probably have to create a system of binding budget
ceilings on health-care providers. Whether these budget caps actually work in
the United States would depend critically on the increases in medical costs
allowed under the law.
The Canadian experience illustrates why the Federal Health Expenditure
Board would not necessarily curb rising costs. Canada's increase in health-care
spending mirrors the one observed in the United States even though the
53. ExEcuTivE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4.
54. S. 1227, supra note 5.
55. E.g., H.R. 1300, supra note 6, at § 2132.
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Canadian system contains mechanisms to strictly regulate spending
increases.56 Similarly, voluntary efforts to control the rise in costs, and state-
operated Certificate of Need programs designed to control the diffusion of
medical technology have not been effective in reducing hospital costs.1
7
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Debate on the costs of expanding health insurance has been confused by
the many ways in which costs may be evaluated. As we have shown, the
spending of any plan to reform the health-care system must be assessed along
three dimensions: (1) net new spending; (2) distribution of spending; and
(3) the rise in spending. Failure to distinguish between net new costs and the
distribution of spending may cause a plan's dismissal even though its costs are
relatively low. For example, as discussed above, many believe that the
proposal submitted by the U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive
Health Care (the Pepper Commission) was removed from serious consideration
due to its high costs." Yet careful analysis shows that the net new spending
from the plan was half the figure circulating on Capitol Hill. 9
Estimates of net new spending to cover all currently uninsured U.S.
citizens range from $10 to $25 billion.6" Variance in net new spending across
proposed plans generally reflects differences in eligibility and enrollment,
benefits, cost-sharing, and provider reimbursement. Net new spending can also
vary due to assumptions about consumer behavior and the effect of plans to
reduce inefficiency in the health-care system. Government's role in the health
reform plan is not necessarily a determinant of the size of net new spending.
By contrast, the way in which payments are distributed and the anticipated
role of government depend critically on the type of reform that is chosen by
legislators. Tax credit proposals whereby individuals are given vouchers or
tax credits to purchase health insurance will tend to increase consumer
payments through the conventional insurance system. Employment-based
proposals, which build on the current system by requiring or placing strong
incentives on employers to provide coverage, tend to increase the burden on
business. Public insurance proposals tend to shift payments to the federal
government.
56. See data in George J. Shieber & Jean-Pierre Poullier, International Health Care Expenditure
Trends: 1987, 8 HEALTH AFF. 174 (1989).
57. Frank A. Sloan & Bruce Steinwald, Effects of Regulation on Hospital Costs and Input Use, 23
J.L. ECON. 81, 105 (1980).
58. 1990: A Year in Review, supra note 2.
59. U.S. BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE, supra note 3, at 9.
60. Lewin-ICF calculation, based on the Health Benefits Simulation Model, supra note 46.
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A more important long-term measure of spending is whether an insurance
plan puts forth a credible and effective case for how the rise in spending is to
be controlled. Control of spending is of critical importance since access can
be expected to continue to erode in its absence. To date, no plan has
recognized that in order for spending to be controlled, the diffusion of
expensive new technology will have to be slowed. Any of the three prototypes
discussed above could, in theory, contain effective spending controls. But the
presence of such mechanisms is no substitute for the strong political will
necessary to face the difficult political situation naturally arising from a
decision to limit the diffusion of new medical technology.
Although estimates indicate that the net new spending required to insure
the uninsured is small ($10-25 billion) relative to the annual rise in spending,
the overall cost problem remains unresolved. Political consensus on a reform
strategy has been thwarted by a lack of agreement on the proper role of
government in financing and delivering health care and by disagreement over
the distribution of financing expansions in care. Moreover, our inability to
temper the explosion in health-care spending has made policymakers cautious
about expanding coverage without simultaneously adopting strategies to control
costs. As the debate moves forward, understanding the interplay among the
three dimensions of cost-net new spending, the distribution of spending, and
the rise in spending-will be critical to evaluating competing medical-care
reform proposals.
